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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 












- Respondent, ) 
-Appellant* ) 
Case No, 6217 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion, 
granted under Utah Code Annotated 77-24-3, in denying defen-
dant's motion to set aside his plea of guilty and substitute 
a plea of not guilty, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Blaine Larson, pled guilty to a charge 
of knowingly and intentionally possessing marijuana; a Class A 
misdemeanor. The plea was entered in Fourth Judicial District 
Court of the State of Utah. The defendant was represented by 
counsel, Mr. Gary H. Weight, and fully informed of the conse-
quenses of his plea. The record recited that the plea was 
freely and voluntarily made. 
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Prior to the date set for sentencing the defendant 
4 
became dissatisfied with his counsel's effectiveness in handl-
ing the case and obtained new counsel, Mr* Long, Mr. Long then 
made a motion to set aside the guilty plea on the grounds that 
I 
the defendant had supplied his new counsel with information, not 
previously known to Mr. Weight, which made it evident that he 
had a valid defense to the above-named charge. The motion was 
supported by an affidavit which went uncontradicted by the pros-
ecution. The affidavit alleged that on the night defendant was 
charged with the above-named offense he had been asleep on the 
living room couch of the residence where officers came with a 
warrant of arrest, and when the officers knocked on the door, 
awakening defendant, he put on a pair of overalls which, when 
the officers searched them, were found to contain a substance 
alleged to have been found on his person. The defendant did 
not inform his original attorney, Mr. Weight, of this fact ^ 
which offered the defendant a valid defense to the crime of 
knowingly and intentionally possessing marijuana since he did 
not know the marijuana was in the overalls and did not intend 4 
to possess it at the time he was searched. 
The motion to set aside defendant's guilty plea was 
denied and a motion to suppress the evidence which was made con- 4 
currently was declared moot. The defendant was subsequently 
sentenced to one year in jail. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
For the Court to reverse the lower court's decision 
and grant the Appellant's motion to set aside his plea of 
guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty and remand to lower 
court for trial on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, GRANTED 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 77-24-3, IN REFUSING TO 
PERMIT DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY AND 
SUBSTITUTE A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY. 
A. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS GUILTY PLEA 
WAS TIMELY FILED, PRIOR TO THE DATE SET FOR SEN-
TENCING, AND WAS SUPPORTED BY AN AFFIDAVIT ALLEG-
ING THAT DEFENDANT HAD A VALID DEFENSE TO THE 
OFFENSE WITH WHICH HE WAS CHARGED. 
The statute which grants the trial court the discre-
tion to either permit or deny a motion to set aside a guilty 
plea is Utah Code Annotated 77-24-3, which reads, "The court 
may, at any time before judgment, upon a plea of guilty, per-
mit it to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." 
Defendant's motion to set aside his guilty plea was timely 
filed on May 21, 1976 prior to the date set for his sentencing 
which was May 28, 197 6. 
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In Utah, as well as the majority of states, the de-
fendant is allowed upon the discretion of the court to also 
withdraw a guilty plea following sentencing although not pro-
vided for by statute, Idaho, which has a statute identical 
to Utah, Idaho Code Criminal Procedure § 19-1714, has noted 
in a Supreme Court decision, State v, Jackson, 96 Idaho 584, 
532 P2d 926 (1975), in which the defendant sought to withdraw 
a guilty plea to second degree kidnapping prior to sentencing 
that a more lenient standard is applied on a motion to with-
draw a guilty plea prior to, rather than following, sentencing. ^ 
The court held in this case that the trial court had abused 
its discretion in denying defendant's pre-sentence motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea where the plea was conditional and did * 
not admit to the facts on which it was based. The defendant 
in the case at hand, should have been allowed to withdraw his 
guilty plea because his motion to set aside the plea was timely 4 
entered and justice favors resolving doubts in a trial on the 
merits of the case. 
West's Ann. Pen. Code § 1018, a California Statute, 4 
reads similar to Utah's statute, "On application of the de-
fendant at any time before judgment the court may, for good 
cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a I 
plea of not guilty substituted." 
In the case of People v. Young, 291 P2d 980 (Dist. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ct. of App., Cal. 1956), the court held that the trial court 
had abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant 
to withdraw his plea of guilty. The defendant was allegedly 
informed by his attorney preceding trial that the attorney was 
ill-prepared to handle his case. The court in its reasoning 
cites West's Ann. Pen. Code § 1018, "The least surprise or in-
fluence causing a defendant to plead guilty when he has any de-
fense at all should be sufficient cause to permit a change of 
plea from guilty to not guilty.11 
Since defendant subsequently discovered he had a valid 
defense to the charge of "knowingly and intentionally possessing 
marijuana" he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea of 
guilty in order to avoid injustice since his prior guilty plea 
was motivated by ignorance of his defense. 
In another California case, People v. McGarrey, 142 
P2d 92 (1943), the defendant pled guilty to manslaughter after 
conferring with an attorney and not of his own choosing. When 
the trial court refused to allow defendant to withdraw his 
guilty plea the court of appeals held that it had abused its 
discretion since the defendant's right to be represented by 
counsel of his own choice had been invaded. The court also 
noted that, "The withdrawal of a plea of guilty should not be 
denied in any case where it is in the least evidence that the 
ends of justice would be subserved by permitting the defendant 
to have pled not guilty instead" (p. 95, supra). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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<* 
In the case at hand it is evident that the ends of ' 
justice would be served by allowing defendant to withdraw a 
plea based upon inadvertence and a mistaken belief that he had 
no defense to the charge which he pled guilty to. In State v. -
Triplett, 96 Ariz. 199, P.2d 666 (1964) based on a statute similar 
to Utah's the defendant pled guilty to kidnapping and the court 
held that defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his plea ( 
of guilty. The court noted the reason for its decision was that 
psychiatric reports concerning defendant's mental condition at 
the time the acts were committed, made after defendant entered a | 
plea of guilty were sufficient to raise a jury question on his 
insanity and thereby giving him a defense to the charge of kidnap-
ping. Defendant in the case at hand is in the same position of f 
discovering a valid defense to the offense he was charged with, 
based on information discovered by his new attorney subsequent 
to his plea of guilty. < 
The Oklahoma statute is identical to the Utah statute, 
Okla Statute. Annotated Title 22 § 517, and is the basis for 
the case of Conley v. State, 444 P.2d 252 (1968). Defendant « 
plead guilty to receiving stolen property and uttering a 
forged instrument. The court held the trial court should have 
allowed the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea since he did • 
not realize the consequences of his plea could result in seven-
teen years in the penitentary instead of two years. The court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
noted the standard to be applied in determining whether a de-
fendant should be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea is "where 
it appears that such a (guilty) plea may have been the result 
of inadvertence, ignorance, misunderstanding, misapprehension, 
or without deliberation, and it is apparent that application 
to withdraw the plea is made, in good faith and not for purpose 
of delay or to defeat ends of justice, denial of application 
to withdraw a plea of guilty will constitute abuse of discre-
tion" (p. 253, supra). Applying this standard to the case at 
hand it is clear that defendant should have been allowed to 
withdraw his guilty plea since it was entered as a result of 
inadvertence, ignorance and a basic misunderstanding as to what 
his defenses were to the offense to which he pled guilty. 
The Idaho Code of Criminal Procedure 19-1714 is iden-
tical to the Utah statute involved herein. In State v. Law-
rence, 220 P2d 380 (1950) an Idaho case defendant pled guilty 
to grand larceny and subsequently made a motion to set aside 
the judgment. The court held defendant should have been al-
lowed to withdraw his guilty plea even after judgment since he 
lacked familiarity with criminal procedure and his motion was 
timely made and no opposition to his affidavits was made by 
the State. 
In State v. Corvelo, 91 Ariz. 52, 369 P2d 903 £1962), 
the defendant pled guilty to receipt of stolen property and 
the court held the denial of withdrawal of defendants guilty 
-7-
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plea was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, 
because the plea was based on information that did not state 
an offense since no description of the property alleged to be 
received was included in the indictment* 
In a Colorado case, Hutton v. People, 398 P2d 973 
(1965) based on a statute similar to Utah, defendant pled guilty 
to aggravated robbery. He made a motion for leave to withdraw ^ 
the plea to plead guilty to simple robbery since he had not used 
a real pistol. The court held the trial court should have 
granted the motion and cited Champion v. People, 236 P2d 127 | 
(1951), a Colorado Supreme Court case where defendant pled 
guilty to committing mayhem and assault and battery in reliance 
on prosecutor's promise that he would be granted probation. The j 
court in that case also held the trial court abused its discre-
tion in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty 
plea. The court in Hutton, noted, by way of reason, stated | 
that "misapprehension of what constitutes the offense with 
which one is charged would ordinarily move the court to permit 
the withdrawal of his plea of guilty" (p. 130, supra). Clearly 4 
the defendant in the case at hand misapprehended the legal es- j 
sence of the terms "knowingly and intentionally" when he pled 
guilty since he had a defense, based on these concepts• It is I 
immaterial that he recited in the record that he was aware of 
the nature of the offense with which he was charged. 
In State v. Ortiz, 77 N.M. 751, 427 P2d 261 (1967), * 
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the defendant pled guilty to unauthorized entry of a building 
with intent to commit theft in a plea bargain situation where 
the district attorney promised to drop a second count of lar-
ceny and also made an unkept promise of leniency. The court 
held defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea although upon arraignment when the court asked defendant 
if any promise of leniency had been made to the guilty plea he 
answered in the negative. Therefore, courts will not unequiv-
ocally accept statements made by defendants and recited in the 
record, if it is later shown that such statements were unfoun-
ded. 
In Cannon v. State (Okl) 296 P2d 202 (1956, defendant 
pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor. The court held he should have 
been allowd to withdraw his guilty plea since he was a non-
resident and entered the plea under a false impression of the 
consequence. And although the record showed the trial judge 
informed defendant of the consequences of the guilty plea the 
defendant was confused. 
In Abel v. State, (Okl) 383 P2d 710 (1963), the defen-
dant pled guilty to second degree forgery and the court held 
he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea since 
he was not properly arraigned or advised of the consequences 
of his plea and he had no reasonable time to consult an attor-
ney of his choice. 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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0 
In State v. McBane, 279 P2d 218 (1954), the court
 i 
held the defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his 
plea of guilty to desertion of minor children since he was 
not advised of his rights and the nature of the offense charged * 
with. The court also noted that "all doubts should be resolved 
in favor of a trial on its merits" (p. 219, supra) (emphasis 
added)• 4 
-In Hoag v. State (Okl) 483 P2d 753 (1971), defendant 
pled guilty to larceny of personal property and the court held 
he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty. | 
The reasons noted were that he was 18 years of age with no 
high school education and was represented by a court-appointed 
attorney because his parents, who were financially able to f 
hire an attorney of their choice, were not notified. 
I n
 Gray v. State, (Okl) 501 P2d 906 (1972), the defen-
dant pled guilty to grand larceny and the court held the trial 4 
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to with-
draw the plea because too much haste was involved in handling 
the case. The day following defendant's arrest he waived the '•• 
preliminary hearing and entered a guilty plea after talking to 
a court-appointed attorney for only five minutes. 
In Walker v. State, (Okl) 501 P2d 218 (1972, the de- * 
fendant pled guilty to a charge of grand larceny and the court 
held he should have been able to withdraw his plea because of 
-10-
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the swiftness involved in the disposition of his case. He 
consulted a court-appointed attorney on the day following his 
arrest for only two minutes before entering his guilty plea* 
In People v. Denton, 539 P2d, 1309 (Col. App. 1975), 
the defendant pled guilty to first degree burglary and later 
made a motion to vacate judgment and sentence. The court held 
that the rule governing acceptance of a guilty plea was not 
complied with where defendant's counsel, together with the 
trial court, failed to advise defendant of the elements of de-
fense or educate defendant as to the legal definition of the 
crimes with which he was charged. His attorney merely told 
defendant the jury would probably convict him if he went to 
trial. This case approaches the case at hand since defendant 
was not informed by his first attorney, Mr. Weight, that he 
had any legal defenses to the named offense and it was only 
later when his subsequent counsel informed him of a valid de-
fense that he decided to plead not guilty. Had he been aware 
of the legal definition of the charge with all of its ramifi-
cations and defense to the charge he would not have pled guilty 
in the first instance• 
In People v. Mason, 491 P2d 1383 (Colo., 1971) , de-
fendant pled guilty to a charge of aggravated robbery. The 
court held he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea since the trial court did not advise defendant of the ele-
-11-
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4 
ments of the crime with which he was charged but only inquired 
if his attorney had explained them to him. In the case at hand 
the court did explain to the defendant that "knowing and inten-
tional possession" were elements of the crime but failed to in-
I 
form the defendant, or inquire if he had been informed by his 
attorney, of the possible defenses which he may have to the 
charge* 
4 
In State v. Barnes, 134 So 2d 890 (La., 1961), the de-
fendant pled guilty to a charge of embezzlement. The court 
held he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea 
because the nature of the crime was unknown to him and he had 
an adequate defense. 
In Jordan v. State, 107 So 2d 56 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 
1958), the defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of 
moonshine whiskey and the court held she should have been al-
lowed to withdraw her guilty plea. Reasons advanced for the -
court's decision were the fact that she was illiterate, not 
advised of her rights or the consequences of. her plea, and a 
question existed as to whether the search was valid. ^ 
A case in point with the case at hand is State v. 
Virgietal and State v. Dottare, 840 A 14, 81 Ne 2d 295 (1948), 
decided in the Court of Appeals of Ohio. This case is based 4 
on an Ohio statute, Ohio Rules of Crim. Proc, Rule 32.1: 
"Withdrawal to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be 
4 
-12-
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made only before sentence is suspended; but to correct mani-
fest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judg-
ment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his 
plea," This statute has the same effect as the Utah statute 
in giving the trial court discretion to allow or refuse to al-
low a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. 
The defendant in the Virg. case pled guilty to a 
charge of larceny by trick and the issue to be decided was 
whether the Court of Common Pleas prejudicially erred in deny-
ing the defendants permission to withdraw their pleas of guilty 
and substitute pleas of not guilty. The motion for leave to 
withdraw the guilty pleas was made prior to sentencing and the 
Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in refusing to allow the defendants to withdraw their 
guilty pleas. The court stated its reasons for holding that 
•the trial court should have granted defendants' motion for 
leave to withdraw the guilty pleas which are as follows: 
The defendants' motions for leave to withdraw their 
pleas: of guilty were timely filed prior to the date set for 
sentencing. Affidavits were filed, supporting the motions, 
which contained statements alleging the defendants had discov-
ered new evidence which constituted a valid defense to the 
charge in the indictment. The affidavits were unchallenged by 
counter-affidavits or evidence. And the defendants' counsel 
-13-
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stated defendants1 dissatisfaction with his representation of 
them and their desire to employ other counsel and proceed to 
trial. New counsel appeared and urged that the defendants were 
entitled to a trial on the merits. All these reasons cited by 
the court for holding the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to grant defendants' motion for leave to withdraw 
their guilty pleas are present in the case at hand. Defendant 
filed his motion timely prior to sentencing and the motion was 
supported by an uncontroverted affidavit alleging that the de-
fendant had discovered a valid defense to the named charge. 
Also defendant was dissatisfied with his attorney and proceeded 
to employ new counsel who advised him of his defense to the . 
charge in the event that he should plead not guilty. Whereupon 
defendant made a motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea 
which was wrongfully refused by the trial court. 
I I • • 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, GRANTED 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 77-24-3, IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY. 
A. DEFENDANT'S FIRST COUNSEL, EMPLOYED AT THE TIME 
HE ENTERED THE GUILTY PLEA, WAS INEFFECTIVE IN 
HANDLING DEFENDANT'S CASE. 
Defendant's counsel, employed at the time he entered 
his plea of guilty, was ineffective in handling his case be-
-14-
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cause he was not aware of certain pertinent facts which im-
bued defendant with a defense to the charge and was therefore 
unable to advise defendant of his defense and the desirability 
of entering a plea of not guilty. 
In the case of In Re Cronin, 336 A 2d 164, (Vermont, 
1975), the court, in applying the same standard to juvenile 
cases, remanded the case to the trial court, in which the de-
fendant sought to withdraw his plea of guilty, to determine the 
effectiveness of his counsel in handling his case. The court 
reasoned that the guilty plea could not be deemed to have been 
voluntarily made if the defendant's counsel was ineffective in 
his particular case although he may be a compentent counsel in 
general. 
In State v. Kincheloe, 87 N.M. 34, 528 P2d 893 (1974), 
the defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault on a peace of-
ficer. A subsequent attorney secured by the defendant had 
filed a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty on the grounds 
that the court-appointed attorney, employed at the time the 
plea was entered and who had died prior to sentencing, did not 
discuss with defendant his various defenses but instead told 
him he would be found guilty. The court held the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to with-
draw his plea of guilty since he did not have effective assist-
ance of counsel at the time the plea was entered and therefore 
-15-
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it could not have been freely, intelligently or knowingly 
given. In the case at hand defendant was not represented by 
effective counsel under the circumstances at the time his plea 
was entered which is evidenced by the fact that the attorney 
which he employed subsequent to entering the guilty plea ad-
vised him of his valid defense to the charge. Since the defen-
dant was not effectively represented at the time he pled guilty 
the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made, thus he should 
have been allowed to withdraw the guilty plea and proceed to 
trial on the merits by substituting a plea of not guilty. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, in the interest of promoting the ends 
of justice should have been allowed to withdraw his plea of 
guilty and proceed to trial. Defendant has a valid defense to 
the named charge and he should be allowed to assert that defense 
in a trial on the merits of his case. There is no reason to 
deny him the opportunity to try his case before a jury since his 
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty was timely filed, prior to 
the date set for sentencing, and supported by an affidavit stat-
ing ample grounds for granting the motion. The defendant was 
not aware that he had a valid defense to the charge at the time 
he entered the guilty plea. This lack of awareness, due to the 
fact that his attorney at that time was not adequately informed 
and therefore ineffective, vitiated any voluntariness on the 
-16-
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part of the defendant in entering the plea of guilty. Since 
the District Court abused its discretion in denying defendant's 
motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea, the court's error 
should be remedied by allowing defendant to substitute a plea 
of not guilty and proceed to trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
N/ LONG 
Attorrr^ y for Defendant-Appellant 
731 East South T-efriple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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